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Abstract 
Australia’s corporate insolvency regime strives to provide flexible measures that allow 
stakeholders of a financially distressed company to come to a mutually beneficial 
arrangement. As with all insolvency laws, it is possible to bind dissenting creditors to the 
will of the majority in resolving these disputes. How flexible should corporate insolvency 
law be in facilitating corporate reorganisations? To what extent can/should individual 
creditors be forced to limit their rights against other stakeholders in the insolvency, 
including rights against third parties, in the name of collective benefit? This important 
question has recently been the subject of conflicting statements in several Federal Court 
decisions. After an expedited hearing the High Court dismissed an appeal from one of 
these Federal Court decisions in the Lehman Brothers case on 30 March 2010 and will 
release its reasons on 14 April 2010. This note considers the legal and policy issues 
involved in this matter. 
Introduction 
The global financial crisis (GFC) that began in 2007 saw a substantial tightening in business 
lending conditions that has made obtaining debt finance much more difficult than had 
previously been the case. Difficulties caused by this shift in lending conditions have been 
compounded by a dramatic loss of market confidence in complex funding models and 
opaque financial products which has dragged down the capital markets across the globe. 
This has had negative flow-on effects for the broader financial system as banks became 
more reluctant to lend, even to other substantial banks. What started as a sub prime 
mortgage crisis in the United States became the GFC, with many predicting another great 
depression.  
Businesses that relied heavily on a continuous stream of funding from the debt 
capital markets, such as non-bank mortgage lender Rams Home Loans and infrastructure 
managers such as Allco Finance Group and Babcock & Brown, increasingly found it 
difficult to roll over significant debt funding arrangements and many substantial firms 
entered some form of external administration. The general lack of confidence in complex 
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financial institutions contributed to negative market sentiment about even the largest 
financial firms, such as AIG (the largest insurance company in the world), Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac (firms that held hundreds of billions of US dollars in residential mortgages in 
the US) and Bear Stearns (a substantial Wall St investment bank) which had to be bailed out 
by the US federal government.1  
It was in this environment that Lehman Brothers, one of the five largest US 
investment banks and a globally significant financial services firm with operations in many 
countries including Australia, collapsed in September 2008. When the short term debt 
market lost confidence in Lehman’s ability to repay its loans, and the price of credit default 
insurance over Lehman’s corporate bonds skyrocketed, the adverse market sentiment against 
Lehman effectively shut the business down when it was unable to continue raising money to 
fund its business and counterparties lost confidence in its ability to complete future 
transactions. After unsuccessfully attempting to have the US federal government bail out the 
company, the company entered Chapter 11 proceedings under the US Bankruptcy Code 
1978 on 15 September 2008 with similar insolvency proceedings commenced in other 
jurisdictions where Lehman maintained operations. The Australian Lehman subsidiary 
entered voluntary administration under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
(‘Corporations Act’) on 26 September 2008. The global insolvency administration of 
Lehman entities has been said to be the most complex and expensive insolvency 
proceedings to date, with insolvency fees estimated to top US$1 billion before the 
administrations around the world are completed.2  
The huge scale of the Lehman collapse, and the numbers of investors and creditors 
adversely affected by the collapse set the scene for potentially endless litigation in several 
countries involving Lehman’s dealings in all types of structured financial products 
(including the much maligned ‘collateralised debt obligations’ or CDOs that were sold to 
regional councils, including the City of Swan) to equity and debt-based derivatives, 
custodial arrangements for assets and securities, share trading and other financial services. 
Lehman faces an avalanche of claims arising from its trading activities around the world. 
The Financial Times reported recently that over US$800 billion in claims had already been 
made against Lehman’s US-based assets.3 The potential for expensive drawn out litigation 
provides a strong incentive for Lehman entities to seek finality through ‘global settlements’ 
with affected parties. This has involved proposing the payment of funds by Lehman for the 
benefit of claimants in a particular jurisdiction on the condition that those claimants release 
their claims not only against the Lehman entity operating in that jurisdiction but all Lehman 
 
1  See further Michael Legg and Jason Harris, ‘How the American Dream Became a Global Nightmare: An 
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<http://www.ft.com> at 15 January 2010.  
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entities and their officers worldwide. Obviously there is little incentive for Lehman Brothers 
US or Lehman Brothers Hong Kong to provide funds to settle disputes in Australia if 
creditors of Lehman Brothers Australia can then make further claims against the parent 
company.  
It is clear that there is utility in providing a global resolution to these disputes rather 
than consume the remaining Lehman assets in expensive litigation around the world. Indeed, 
the underlying justification for corporate insolvency law rests in the view that a mandatory 
collective process that compromises the enforcement of individual contract claims in 
exchange for a rateable return to all unsecured creditors (subject to a statutory priority list of 
privileged creditors such as employees) is a better system. This raises the difficult, but 
important, issue of how far such ‘global resolutions’ may reach. In particular, is it 
appropriate for insolvency arrangements to restrict, or even take away, creditor rights to sue 
third parties including those third parties related to the debtor company, in this case Lehman 
entities in other jurisdictions and their officers and insurers? Of course, there is nothing to 
stop individual creditors from voluntarily releasing or waiving their legal rights against third 
parties as a condition precedent to participating in a global resolution. It is a difficult 
question, however, to determine whether creditors should be forced to give up their rights on 
an involuntary basis. In other words, can insolvency law accommodate the compulsory 
acquisition of rights of dissenting creditors by use of a formal arrangement? There are 
conflicting lines of precedent on this question, both in Australia and in other common law 
countries such as the United States, Canada and England. In particular, 2009 saw two 
differently constituted full Federal Court benches make differing rulings on the question of 
third party releases.  
In Fowler v Lindholm4 the court ruled that a scheme of arrangement could include a 
third party release. That case involved a scheme made up of several hundred million dollars 
provided by the ANZ Bank and Merrill Lynch to settle claims by creditors of the Opes 
Prime margin lending business. In contrast, in City of Swan v Lehman Brothers Australia 
Ltd,5 the Court ruled that a deed of company arrangement proposed by Lehman’s Hong 
Kong-based parent company, which included a fund of over $40 million, was invalid 
because it contained releases of claims that creditors of Lehman’s Australia may have 
against Lehman entities worldwide and its officers and insurers. If this had been the only 
effect of the decisions it could be said that third party releases are only permitted in schemes 
and not in deeds of company arrangement. However, the court in Lehman made it clear that 
it did not believe that the Fowler decision on this point was correct, thus creating substantial 
uncertainty about the proper scope of both schemes and deeds of company arrangement.   
On 14 December 2009, the High Court of Australia granted special leave to appeal the 
decision of the Full Federal Court in Lehman. After an expedited hearing on 9 and 
10 February 2010 the High Court dismissed the appeal on 30 March 2010 and will deliver 
 
4  (2009) 178 FCR 563 (‘Fowler’). 
5  (2009) 179 FCR 243 (‘Lehman’). 
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its reasons for doing so on 14 April 2010. This article will discuss the important issues 
raised by the case and the potential implications for Australian corporate insolvency law.  
The Legal Context of the Decision 
Insolvency Arrangements in Australia 
Insolvency arrangements may be undertaken on an informal basis simply by obtaining the 
consent of relevant parties to the arrangement (commonly called a ‘workout’). Alternatively, 
insolvency arrangements may involve a more formal agreement that is facilitated by the 
Corporations Act. These formal arrangements may be based on provisions in Part 5.1 of the 
Corporations Act (called ‘schemes of arrangement’) or Part 5.3A Division 10 of the 
Corporations Act (called ‘deeds of company arrangement’).  
Although each of these procedures have different requirements, the content of each is 
largely determined by the parties involved as the statutory provisions set out merely what 
information must be included, not what the relevant terms must be. Both schemes and deeds 
may involve elements of delayed and/or compromised debt repayments, debt reorganisations 
including debt for equity or debt for asset swaps, asset sales, corporate spin offs or 
demergers and changes to the underlying business. These features are more commonly 
found where the underlying business is being restructured in an attempt to save it and the 
formal arrangement is needed to protect the company and its assets from litigation by 
dissenting creditors.  
Where the scheme or deed is in reality a device to liquidate the company and wind 
down the business, as occurred with both Opes Prime and Lehman, the contents of the 
arrangement usually will involve a compromise of the debts and a moratorium on further 
action by the creditors against the debtor company. As noted above, what makes both of 
these cases contentious is that their arrangements also included extensive third party 
releases. The scope of schemes and deeds of company arrangement will now be discussed. 
Schemes of Arrangement 
Schemes of arrangement have been present in Australian corporate statutes since the 1870s 
and were the primary mechanism for corporate reorganisation prior to 1993, when voluntary 
administration and deeds of company arrangement were introduced into the Corporations 
Act. The scheme provisions are very flexible in that they do not prescribe exactly what form 
a scheme proposal must take. The main scheme provision is s 411 of the Act which requires 
a party proposing a scheme between the company and its creditors or any class of its 
creditors to seek court approval before distributing the proposed scheme document and 
explanatory memorandum to the creditors and convening a creditors meeting.6 If the court is 
satisfied that the scheme documentation complies with the requirements of Part 5.1 it will 
allow a creditors’ meeting to be convened to vote on the scheme proposal. A scheme 
 
6  Corporations Act s 411(1). 
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proposal must be approved by a majority of creditors (or class of creditors for a scheme 
limited to a particular class) that must comprise a minimum of 75 per cent of the debt held 
by the creditors in that class who are entitled to vote in person or by proxy.7 If the meeting 
approves of the scheme with the requisite majorities, the scheme proponents must then seek 
court approval to implement the scheme.8 While the statute provides a default set of 
standard terms for schemes of arrangement these may be replaced by the actual scheme 
document.9 The scheme provisions therefore allow the parties to a scheme to design an 
arrangement that suits their needs. 
Schemes have not been a commonly used device for corporate reorganisations since 
the introduction of voluntary administration in 1993 because they are generally time 
consuming and expensive to implement due to the statutory requirement for two court 
approvals to be obtained before the scheme can be implemented. The deed of company 
arrangement procedure which may follow voluntary administration can achieve similar 
results but is generally much faster and simpler than a scheme of arrangement. Deeds of 
company arrangement are discussed further below. 
Creditors’ schemes have also traditionally been plagued with problems concerning if 
and when creditors must be divided into separate classes. Other jurisdictions, such as the 
United States, have addressed the problem of dissenting classes by the use of a ‘cram down’ 
mechanism that binds dissenting classes of creditors by court order.10 However, the scheme 
of arrangement provisions in the Act contain no such power for dissenting classes of 
creditors, although minority creditors in each class are bound assuming the other 
requirements of s 411 are met.  
One significant advantage offered by schemes of arrangement over other formal 
mechanisms is the ability to vary the system of equal treatment of similar claims in 
insolvency (known as ‘pari passu’).11 The constant supervision of the court under a scheme 
also provides significant protection to dissenting creditors who may oppose either the initial 
distribution of the scheme documentation or convening of the creditors meeting and/or may 
oppose the final court approval of the scheme. It has been recognised that the court is not 
bound to sanction the scheme merely because the majority, even a significant majority, of 
creditors have approved the scheme proposal. This is because the court has general 
supervisory jurisdiction over schemes and must ensure that the scheme is not oppressive. 
The court is concerned with ensuring that the scheme proposal is consistent with 
‘commercial morality’.12 
 
7  Corporations Act s 411(4)(a). 
8  Corporations Act s 411(4)(b). 
9  Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) Sch 8. 
10  Bankruptcy Code 1978 (US) s 1129. 
11  Re Trix [1970] 3 All ER 397. 
12  Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Co [1891] 1 Ch 213. 





                                                                                                                            
Deeds of Company Arrangement 
A deed of company arrangement is more than an agreement between the company and its 
creditors. It is a statutory device that changes the status of the company from voluntary 
administration into a deed of company arrangement.13 It can only occur following a 
voluntary administration under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act, which may be initiated by 
a secured creditor or liquidator, but is usually commenced by an ordinary resolution of the 
debtor company’s board of directors.14 There is no need for court approval to initiate 
voluntary administration. The administration is designed to be fast and efficient in order to 
minimise its impact on the company’s stakeholders. The administrator’s primary 
responsibility is to investigate the company’s financial position and provide an opinion to 
the creditors at the second meeting (after an initial meeting to allow the creditors to confirm 
the appointment and establish a committee of creditors if necessary), which must be 
convened within 25 business days after appointment (although an extension of time is 
possible).15 The purpose of the final creditors’ meeting is to determine the future of the 
company. The creditors are required to decide whether the company should be: 
• wound up
• placed into a deed of company arrangement (if one has been proposed); o
• removed from administration with control returned to the directors.16
Similar to a scheme of arrangement, the statute requires that certain matters be covered 
in a deed but the form of the deed itself is left to be determined by the parties.17 This will 
involve a party proposing a deed, there may be multiple deeds put forward, which the 
administrator will then comment on in his or her report to creditors for the final meeting. 
The creditors then vote by ordinary majority in number, which must also correspond with a 
majority of unsecured debts owed by the company.18 If the creditors approve of the deed, 
the company and the administrator have 15 business days to execute the deed.19 If executed 
properly, the deed will take the company out of voluntary administration and the 
relationship between the company and its unsecured creditors will be governed by the terms 
of the deed.  
Unlike a scheme of arrangement, there is no requirement to put the creditors into 
relevant classes. Furthermore, there is no requirement to seek court certification of the deed 
that operates under the force of Part 5.3A Division 10 of the Act. The court does however 
have general supervisory powers over companies operating under a deed of company 
arrangement. Any interested person may seek the assistance of the court to either terminate 
 
13  MYT Engineering Pty Ltd v Mulcon Pty Ltd (1999) 195 CLR 636. 
14  Corporations Act ss 436A–436C. 
15  Corporations Act s 439A. 
16  Corporations Act s 439C. 
17  Corporations Act s 444A; Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) Sch 8A. 
18  Corporations Act s 439C; Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) Reg 5.6.19, 5.6.21.  
19  Corporations Act s 444B.  
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or vary the deed.20 In particular, the court has extremely broad powers under s 447A, which 
allows the court to ‘make such order as it thinks appropriate about how this Part is to operate 
in relation to a particular company.’ 
It is important to note that a significant difference between schemes and deeds of 
company arrangement are that the deed provisions in Part 5.3A Division 10 set out a 
detailed framework for the operation of the deed and how it affects different stakeholders 
such as secured and unsecured creditors, lessors, shareholders, etc. Section 444D specifies 
that the deed will only bind creditors ‘so far as concerns claims arising on or before the 
[commencement] day specified in the deed’. Furthermore, s 444H provides that a deed will 
only release the debtor company from a debt where the creditor is covered by the deed and 
the deed provides for a release. Clearly, deeds of company arrangement are creatures of 
statute and can only effect creditor rights by reason of their statutory force. 
In contrast, the scheme of arrangement provisions provide only a brief statement about 
how the scheme binds creditors and that the court may grant approval of the scheme subject 
to conditions. The different regulatory techniques used for schemes and deeds were a key 
issue in both the Opes and Lehman cases.  
The Opes Prime Litigation 
The Opes Prime litigation involved a contentious scheme of arrangement proposed by the 
liquidator of Opes Prime, a stock broking firm involved in margin lending. Opes Prime’s 
margin lending arrangements were very popular because they allowed margin accounts over 
relatively small stocks traded on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), which most 
large financial firms (such as the major banks) would not allow to be used in margin 
accounts. Investors using these services claimed that they were misled into believing that 
their transactions were margin loans when in reality (as was clear from the loan 
documentation) the transactions involved a transfer of the securities to an Opes Prime 
subsidiary in exchange for the loan. Opes had a contractual obligation to return equivalent 
securities back to the investors upon repayment of the loan.21  
When Opes defaulted on its financing arrangements with ANZ and Merrill Lynch 
those institutions appointed receivers who then sold the shares held by Opes under the 
securities lending agreements. Large quantities of shares in small companies were sold onto 
what was an already falling market and many investors suffered huge losses when Opes 
defaulted on their contractual obligation to return equivalent securities when it collapsed. 
With Opes insolvent, many investors in several countries made allegations against ANZ and 
Merrill Lynch for their involvement with Opes Prime. Total losses from Opes Prime were 
well over AUD1 billion, much of which was caused by the large falls in the ASX during 
2008. Claims against Opes by investors were estimated by the liquidators at over $600 
 
20  Corporations Act s 445D. 
21  Beconwood Securities Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2008) 246 ALR 361. See 
further Stacey Steele, ‘Lessons (to be) Learnt from the Opes Prime Insolvency’ (2008) 32 Melbourne 
University Law Review 1127. 
148 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 32:141 
 
                                                                                                                            
million. Class actions were threatened and the ANZ in particular faced extensive public 
criticism for its role in funding the Opes Prime business model. During this time, several 
other securities and financial services businesses collapsed including Chimera Capital and 
Lift Capital. There was considerable public concern about the role of Australia’s large banks 
in financially backing the failed businesses and then selling the transferred shares when the 
businesses collapsed further compounding the losses suffered by investors. The liquidators 
alleged also that ANZ and Merrill Lynch had invalidly taken security over Opes’ assets, a 
claim which, if upheld, could recover in excess of $275 million. The banks were therefore 
facing claims from the liquidators in Australia, as well as numerous investors in several 
jurisdictions. Clearly, a negotiated global settlement would provide a better outcome than 
dozens of complex court cases which would take considerable time and money. 
The liquidators for Opes Prime negotiated a settlement with ANZ and Merrill Lynch 
after a difficult and lengthy dispute resolution process. This involved the banks paying over 
$240 million into a settlement fund set up using a scheme of arrangement. The key 
condition to the provision of this funding was that the Opes creditors agree to give a release 
to the banks from any claims they may have in respect of their dealings with Opes Prime.  
At the first court hearing the scheme was allowed to go forward22 and creditors 
overwhelmingly approved the deal, which saw them paid approximately 37 cents in the 
dollar within a short time after the final vote. There is no doubt that any funds from 
litigation would have taken much longer and with greater costs, and without any certainty of 
success. The court at first instance emphasised that schemes of arrangement involve an 
element of give and take by both the company and its creditors. Finkelstein J stated that a 
scheme of arrangement could not involve a creditor giving up ‘all his [or her] claims without 
a compensating advantage, or a scheme which involves the confiscation of rights’23 His 
Honour rejected the argument that the scheme involved a confiscation of rights because the 
banks were offering the funds in satisfaction of the claims against them.24 His Honour 
offered a test in the following terms: ‘provided there is a sufficient nexus between a release 
and the relationship between the creditor and the scheme company, the scheme can validly 
incorporate the release’.25 This point was not accepted by the subsequent full bench decision 
in Lehman that is discussed below. 
The decision to approve the scheme of arrangement in Opes was unsuccessfully 
appealed by an individual Opes creditor (Fowler). Fowler’s primary argument was that the 
schemes were improperly sanctioned by the court because a scheme could ‘only bind a 
creditor in his or her capacity as a creditor and in no other capacity’.26 This direct challenge 
to the initial court’s sanction of the scheme including third party releases was unsuccessful. 
The court recognised that there must be some limit to the rights and interests that can be 
 
22  Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd (No 2) (2009) 179 FCR 20 (‘Opes’). 
23  Opes (2009) 179 FCR 20, [31]. 
24  Opes (2009) 179 FCR 20, [33].  
25  Opes (2009) 179 FCR 20, [55]. 
26  Fowler (2009) 178 FCR 563, [58]. 
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affected by a scheme, and noted that merely involving the company and its creditors would 
not justify sanctioning a scheme that confiscated a creditor’s property rights without 
compensation.27 
The Full Court’s reasoning is encapsulated by the following statements: 
A scheme of arrangement between a company and its creditors or a class of creditors is no 
more than a proposal to vary or modify the company’s obligations in relation to its debts and 
liabilities owed to the creditors or class of creditors. There is nothing to prevent the company 
from posing, as part of the arrangement, a term to the effect that, in consideration of what 
the company has provided under the scheme, the creditors will discharge not only the debts 
and liabilities of the company, but also the liabilities of, for example, sureties for the same 
debts and liabilities of the company.28  
There are of course different ways to implement this, one of which is to require the creditors 
to enter into separate agreements (by way of a deed of indemnity and release) as a condition 
precedent to the scheme coming into effect.29 For example consider the following statement 
from the court in Fowler:  
[T]here is no reason why a bargain might not be struck between a company and creditors 
whereby the creditors are bound to enter into an arrangement with third parties. So long as 
there is some element of give and take, such that the creditors receive something in return 
for the benefit conferred on a third party, there is no reason in principle why that term could 
not be part of a scheme of arrangement as contemplated by s 411.30 
This is entirely consistent with existing precedent. However, what the statement is referring 
to is a scheme of arrangement containing a condition precedent or condition subsequent that 
requires the creditors to form an agreement with third parties (such as providing a deed of 
indemnity or release). It is well established that a scheme of arrangement cannot bind third 
parties, and has effect only between the company and its creditors by force of statute.31 It is 
another thing entirely to bind creditors to a release by including the transaction involving the 
third party in the scheme proposal itself which takes effect not by collateral arrangement 
(which prior precedent accepts) but by the statutory force of a scheme of arrangement.  
The Full Federal Court in Lehman 
The decision in Lehman was handed down on 25 September 2009 with each of the three 
judges (Stone, Rares and Perram JJ) giving individual opinions that invalidated the deed of 
company arrangement. The central issue was whether the provisions of Part 5.3A 
Division 10 of the Corporations Act could accommodate a deed that contained third party 
releases. The deed had been approved by the requisite majority of creditors, although the 
majority of creditors by value consisted of entities related to Lehman Brothers Australia. 
 
27  Fowler (2009) 178 FCR 563, 578. 
28  Fowler (2009) 178 FCR 563, [68]. 
29  Re Glendale Land Development Ltd (in liq) [1982] 2 NSWLR 563.  
30  Fowler (2009) 178 FCR 563, [69]. 
31  Shaw v Royce Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 138. 
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There is no requirement in creditor meetings to decide on deeds of company arrangement 
that related party votes be excluded. The court has jurisdiction to overturn a vote or to 
convene another meeting where the result of a creditors vote was determined by related 
parties.32 
The case turned on the proper interpretation of s 444D(1) of the Act that establishes 
the binding effect of a deed. As noted above, that section provides ‘A deed of company 
arrangement binds all creditors of the company, so far as concerns claims arising on or 
before the day specified in the deed’. This raises the question as to the scope of ‘claims 
arising on or before the date specified in the deed’, which must be no later than the date 
when the administrator was appointed.33 The members of the Full Court all agreed that this 
phrase can only refer to claims that arise because of the person’s status as a creditor of the 
company. All three members of the court applied principles of statutory interpretation by 
examining the role and purpose of deeds of company arrangement within the broader 
context of the voluntary administration regime in Part 5.3A. The court relied upon the fact 
that the deed provisions do not discuss the effect of a deed on rights against third parties 
except to say (under s 444J) that a deed does not affect a creditor’s rights under a guarantee 
or indemnity.34 Furthermore, s 444H provides that a deed only releases a creditor’s claim to 
the extent provided for in the deed. The members of the court also drew support from the 
purposive clause in s 435A which refers to the ‘business, property and affairs of an insolvent 
company’ and specifies that Part 5.3A (which includes the deed provisions) attempts to save 
the business or to provide a better return to creditors than would result from a liquidation. 
Clearly, the commencement of liquidation would impose no limitation on creditors pursuing 
rights against third parties. 
Justice Rares’ opinion provides the strongest rejection of the deed. His Honour stated 
that allowing the deed to stand would be to ‘permit the majority of creditors to use their 
voting power to interfere with, indeed to confiscate, the minority’s property rights and 
causes of action’.35 His Honour found that the scope of claims bound by a deed could only 
encompass claims that were admissible under the deed pursuant to s 444A which requires 
the deed to include details concerning which of its debts will be released by the completion 
of the deed.36 Support for excluding third party releases was also drawn from the fact that 
s 444A mentions only the administrator, the debtor company and its creditors.37 Justice 
Rares held:  
The literal, grammatical, and common sense, construction of s 444D(1) is that it refers to 
claims of creditors corresponding to those referred to in s 444A(4)(b) and (i) that will be 
admissible under the deed of company arrangement for payment by the company to the 
 
32  Corporations Act s 600A. 
33  Corporations Act s 444(4)(i). 
34  Lehman (2009) 179 FCR 243, 253 (Stone J), 268 (Rares J). 
35  Lehman (2009) 179 FCR 243, [74]. 
36  Corporations Act s 444A(4)(d). 
37  Lehman (2009) 179 FCR 243, [83]. 
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extent that the deed provides in substitution for the rights that the creditors would have been 
able to exercise had the company not entered into a deed or administration.38  
As noted above, the appeal to the High Court was dismissed on 30 March 2010 although no 
reasons have been provided by the court at the time of publication. We do not know whether 
the High Court will address the tension between the Fowler and Lehman decisions, although 
the appeal only concerned deeds of company arrangement so any discussion of the scope of 
the scheme provisions would be obiter dicta. 
Comparative Analysis 
The discussion above shows that the current state of the law regarding the use of third party 
releases in corporate reorganisations is uncertain. The use of debt reorganisation plans to 
resolve complex disputes in corporate insolvency, whether by way of a scheme or deed of 
company arrangement or some other collective agreement with or without judicial approval, 
is common in corporate insolvency laws around the world.39 It is therefore useful to 
consider how this issue is dealt with in other jurisdictions. 
England 
There are two mechanisms for insolvency arrangements involving financially distressed 
companies in England: the scheme of arrangement and a ‘company voluntary arrangement’ 
(CVA). The scheme of arrangement provisions40 are similar to the provisions in s 411 of the 
Corporations Act and carry a common heritage.  
The company voluntary arrangement procedure under the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) 
Part 1 and Schedule A1 broadly is similar to the deed of company arrangement procedure 
under Australian corporate insolvency law. The voting thresholds are the same and the terms 
of the arrangement are determined largely by the parties. One difference with Australian 
deeds of company arrangement is that a company voluntary arrangement in England need 
not involve a period of administration beforehand; although, an administrator is given the 
power to propose a CVA, as is a liquidator and the directors of the debtor company. Unlike 
s 444D(1) of the Corporations Act, which specifies that ‘A deed of company arrangement 
binds all creditors of the company, so far as concerns claims arising on or before the day 
specified in the deed’, the CVA provisions in England are broader in that they state that a 
CVA is ‘a proposal under [Part 1] to the company and to its creditors for a composition in 
satisfaction of its debts or a scheme of arrangement of its affairs (from here on referred to, in 
either case, as a “voluntary arrangement”).’41 It might be thought that using language such 
as ‘a proposal’ would allow CVAs to include a wider variety of rights and claims than 
schemes of arrangement would, but that has not been the case. English courts have generally 
 
38  Lehman (2009) 179 FCR 243, [87]. 
39  For a review of see Philip Wood, Principles of International Insolvency (2nd ed, 2007) ch 23. 
40  Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, pt 26. 
41  Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) c 45, s 1(1). 
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restricted CVAs to claims arising because of the claimant’s status as a creditor and not to 
other rights or claims unrelated to their creditor status.  
Although English courts have accepted that third parties may be involved in schemes 
and CVAs, just as Australian courts have accepted that schemes and deeds may involve 
third parties,42 they have not sanctioned CVAs where the proposals involve an involuntary 
release of third party claims. For example, in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v PRG 
Powerhouse Ltd,43 a CVA proposal that included a release of guarantee claims against the 
New Zealand based parent company of an English retail business was struck out. The court 
found that a CVA could not include an automatic release of third party obligations, because 
such a clause would be based on an agreement ‘between creditors as to rights and 
obligations between themselves in a capacity other than as creditors of the company’.44 The 
Court did however accept that a CVA could prevent a creditor from enforcing an obligation 
against a third party where the third party then had a right of recourse against the debtor 
company.45 However, the Court found that the requirement in a CVA to release guarantors 
was unfairly prejudicial which could also allow the CVA proposal to be invalidated.46 It 
should be noted that in Lehman, the issue of whether the deed could be terminated by the 
court on a similar basis under s 445D was not considered given the court’s ruling that the 
deed could not contain a third party release. 
Another case in 2007, this time concerning schemes of arrangement and asbestos 
claims, is also instructive. In Re T&N (No 3),47 the court held that the term ‘arrangement’ in 
the scheme provisions should not be limited by a requirement that a scheme must only alter 
existing rights between the debtor company and its creditors.48 David Richards J stated that 
a scheme is not ‘necessarily outside the section, because its effect is to alter the rights of 
creditors against another party or because such alteration could be achieved by a scheme of 
arrangement with that other party.’49 His Honour applied a nexus test, which was then 
applied by Finkelstein J in Opes and implicitly approved in the appeal of that decision. His 
Honour did note however that ‘[t]he looser the connection between the subject-matter of the 
scheme and the relationship between the company and creditors concerned, the more 
substantial might be the objections on discretionary grounds to sanctioning the scheme.’50 
More recently, in another Lehman Brothers related matter in November 2009, the 
Court of Appeal for England and Wales refused to sanction a scheme of arrangement that 
required Lehman creditors to give up rights they had as beneficiaries of trust property held 
 
42  Shaw v Royce Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 138 (applied to CVAs in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v PRG Powerhouse Ltd 
[2007] EWHC 1002 (Ch)); Re Glendale Land Development Ltd (in liq) [1982] 2 NSWLR 563. 
43  [2007] EWHC 1002 (Ch) (‘PRG’). 
44  PRG [2007] EWHC 1002 (Ch) [51]. For similar comments in relations to schemes of arrangement in Australia 
see Bridges v Hershon [1968] 3 NSWR 47, 55 (Asprey JA). 
45  PRG [2007] EWHC 1002 (Ch), [60]. 
46  Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) c 45, s 6; PRG [2007] EWHC 1002 (Ch) [97]. 
47  [2007] 1 All ER 851 (‘T&N’). 
48  T&N [2007] 1 All ER 851, [53]. 
49  T&N [2007] 1 All ER 851, [53]. 
50  T&N [2007] 1 All ER 851, [54]. 
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by various Lehman entities as part of a settlement.51 In that case, Lehman entities had acted 
as custodian over thousands of securities transactions and it became difficult to determine 
which client/investor owned which particular parcel of securities. The Lehman 
administrators therefore proposed a global resolution that involved Lehman creditors 
agreeing to compromise claims they may have against Lehman entities in respect of 
custodial services provided to them in capacities other than as creditors of Lehman. The 
Court of Appeal rejected the view that a scheme could cover any rights held by a creditor, 
rather the rights altered by the scheme must relate to the person’s capacity as a creditor.52 
However, Patten LJ went on to say: ‘[t]hat formulation does not prevent the inclusion in the 
Scheme of the release of contractual rights or rights of action against related third parties 
necessary in order to give effect to the arrangement proposed for the disposition of the debts 
and liabilities of the company to its own creditors.’53 Contrast this with comments by the 
Master of the Rolls who, although in agreement with Patten LJ’s conclusion that trust 
property could not be included in a scheme of arrangement, seemed to impose a casual 
requirement on the derivation of the claim seeking to be compromised by the scheme. The 
Master said:  
If a person’s claim cannot be said to render him a creditor or a member, then it appears to 
me to follow that the subject matter of the claim could not be covered by the arrangement. 
The fact that he may, in connection with a different claim, be a creditor, does not justify him 
being treated as a creditor for the purpose of the first claim. 54 
It is difficult to assess the precedent value of this statement given that it seems 
inconsistent with the previous comments of Patten LJ and the third member of the court, 
Longmore LJ, merely agreed with the decisions of both Patten LJ and the Master of the 
Rolls. It is possible however to see Patten LJ’s comment regarding a release of contractual 
rights as being mere obiter given the issue under consideration involved proprietary rights in 
a trust rather than mere contractual rights. Of course, even if the Masters’ comment is ratio 
decidendi that would only be persuasive and not binding in Australia, although it should be 
very valuable given the common origins and similar nature of the scheme provisions in both 
Australia and England. It should be noted that the appeal to the High Court of Australia in 
the Lehman case involves the statutory wording of the deed, and not scheme, provisions. 
Canada 
In Canada there are two mechanisms for insolvency arrangements involving corporations in 
financial distress, a formal proposal under Part III of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, 
RSC 1985 (‘BIA’) or a plan of reorganisation under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement 
Act, RSC 1985 (‘CCAA’). It is typical for large corporate reorganisations to be undertaken 
using the CCAA rather than the BIA as the BIA procedure is very rule driven and is therefore 
 
51  Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in admin) [2009] EWCA Civ 1161 (‘LBI’). 
52  LBI [2009] EWCA Civ 1161, [65] (Patten LJ). See also Bridges v Hershon [1968] 3 NSWR 47, 55 
(Asprey JA). 
53  LBI [2009] EWCA Civ 1161, [65]. 
54  LBI [2009] EWCA Civ 1161, [78]. 
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less flexible than the CCAA provisions that are specifically tailored to corporate rescues and 
reorganisations.55  
The inclusion in CCAA plans of third party releases has been accepted in several 
Canadian insolvency cases.56 The most authoritative decision is the recent ruling by the 
Ontario Court of Appeal concerning the restructuring of the Canadian asset backed 
commercial paper market. In that case (Re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II 
Corp57) Blair JA rejected that such releases were an improper confiscation of rights (much 
the same as both Federal Court decisions in the Opes Prime matter rejected this argument in 
respect of the schemes of arrangement). His Honour placed particular emphasis on the class 
voting system used in CCAA proceedings and the requirement for final court approval of the 
reorganisation plan. These requirements are both broadly similar to the requirements of a 
scheme of arrangement under Australian law and bring Blair JA’s reasoning in line with 
comments in the Federal Court in Lehman explaining why the result regarding third party 
releases in Opes Prime was different.58 That is, deeds of company arrangement have a 
consolidated simple majority vote with no court approval, whereas schemes (may) have 
class votes and require two court approvals. 
His Honour adopted a similar test to that used in Opes Prime, that is ‘the CCAA 
permits the inclusion of third party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement to be 
sanctioned by the court where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed 
restructuring.’59 Although his Honour also recognised that something more than the 
proponent’s willingness to provide funds to support the plan is needed in order to create the 
necessary nexus between the release and the arrangement.60 As his Honour said ‘there must 
be a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and 
the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third party release in the 
plan.’61  
Blair JA accepted the following factors as relevant to the identification of the sufficient 
nexus between the releases and the arrangement:62 
(a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of 
the debtor; 
(b) The claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and 
necessary for it; 
(c) The Plan cannot succeed without the releases; 
 
55  See Janis Sarra, Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (2007) 23–30.  
56  See for example, Re Canadian Airlines Corp (2000) 265 AR 201 (Alberta); Re Muscle Tech Research and 
Development Inc (2006) 25 CBR (5th) 231 (Ontario). 
57  (2008) 296 DLR (4th) 135. 
58  Lehman (2009) 179 FCR 243, 267 (Rares J). 
59  Re Metcalfe (2008) 296 DLR (4th) 135, [43]. 
60  Re Metcalfe (2008) 296 DLR (4th) 135, [69]. 
61  Re Metcalfe (2008) 296 DLR (4th) 135, [70]. 
62  Re Metcalfe (2008) 296 DLR (4th) 135, [71]. 
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(d) The parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a 
tangible and realistic way to the Plan; and 
(e) The Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders 
generally.   
Blair JA did point out that several earlier cases had refused to sanction reorganisation 
plans that included third party releases. However, his Honour distinguished those cases on 
the basis that the releases in those matters bore little relationship with the reorganisation 
attempt other than the fact that they involved creditors or the reorganised company, albeit in 
other capacities which therefore did not satisfy the requisite nexus between the release and 
reorganisation.63  
If this standard were applied to the Lehman matter, it is possible that some of the claims 
against Lehman entities and officers could have the necessary nexus in that they were 
involved in designing the allegedly misleading products and funding the marketing and 
distribution of those products. However, the breadth of the proposed release could also catch 
other totally unrelated claims held by creditors against other Lehman entities.  
United States 
Section 524(e) of the US Bankruptcy Code 1978 provides that, with limited exceptions, the 
release of debts under bankruptcy ‘does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the 
property of any other entity for, such debt.’ For present purposes, this section means that a 
plan of reorganisation under the Chapter 11 procedure does not automatically discharge 
third party debts.  
There are however conflicting views about whether reorganisation plans may or may 
not include third party releases. Several decisions in the Courts of Appeal for the Second, 
Third and Seventh Circuits have granted temporary and permanent injunctions under the 
broad equitable injunctive power given to the US Bankruptcy Court under s 105(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Some decisions allow third party releases in reorganisation plans on the 
basis that s 524(e) does not expressly prohibit them.64 Other decisions that have allowed the 
releases only where there is unanimous creditor approval,65 or have otherwise limited their 
effect to creditors who voted in favour of the reorganisation plan.66 Other cases have noted 
that third party releases should only be allowed in rare circumstances because they are a 
 
63  Re Metcalfe (2008) 296 DLR (4th) 135, [79]ff. 
64  In re Airadigm Communications Inc., 519 F3d 640 (7th Cir 2008); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc, 
960 F2d 285 (2nd Cir 1992); In re AH Robins Co, 880 F2d 694 (4th Cir 1986).  
65  In re Specialty Equipment Co, 3 F3d 1043 (7th Cir 1993). 
66  In re West Coast Video Enterprises, Inc, 174 BR 906 (BankrEDPa1994); In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp, 211 BR 
497, 506–07 (BankrDNJ1997); In re Zenith Electronics Corp., 241 BR 92, 111 (BankrDDel1999). 
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device ‘that lends itself to abuse’.67 Various decisions have proposed lists of relevant factors 
similar to those mentioned in the Canadian cases (see above).68  
On the other hand, the Courts of Appeal in the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have 
interpreted s 524(e) as prohibiting third party releases in Chapter 11 plans altogether and 
have therefore refused to grant injunctions under s 105(a).69 
Therefore, in neither the US, Canada or England is there a clear legal mandate to 
include third party releases in insolvency arrangements. Courts in England and Canada 
allow releases for schemes and reorganisation plans under the CCAA respectively, although 
there are still conflicting decisions and the laundry list of relevant considerations do not 
provide clear guidance on the application of the nexus assessment. In each of these 
jurisdictions, the strongest support for third party releases has come from mass tort claims, 
particularly asbestos-related claims.  
Conclusion 
The proper scope of deeds of company arrangement is a fundamental issue for the future 
efficacy of voluntary administration as a tool for restructuring and reorganisation in 
Australia. Although both Lehman Brothers and Opes Prime were businesses winding down, 
the High Court’s decision to uphold the Lehman case will significantly limit the ability to 
use deeds of company arrangement, and hence voluntary administration, as a means of 
restructuring companies in financial distress. This is because corporate reorganisations, 
particularly those involving multinational groups, will often involve a range of complex and 
overlapping claims that make a global resolution a better solution than pursuing individual 
enforcement across different jurisdictions.  
An efficient insolvency regime is not the only regulatory policy goal at play in this 
dispute. The goal of investor protection and promoting better corporate disclosure practices 
is an equally important policy goal.70 Striking down the deed of company arrangement in 
Lehman allows the investors who purchased derivative products from Lehman and its 
subsidiaries in Australia, allegedly in circumstances that were misleading or deceptive, to 
seek compensation from other Lehman entities and their insurers. It should be noted 
however that the cost and scale of the worldwide collapse of Lehman may make it unlikely 
that the Australian plaintiffs will be fully compensated even if they are able to pursue 
 
67  In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F3d 136, 142 (2nd Cir 2005) (‘No case has tolerated nondebtor 
releases absent the finding of circumstances that may be characterized as unique.’) 
68  See further Joshua Silverstein, ‘Hiding in Plain View: A Neglected Supreme Court Decisions Resolves the 
Debate over Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganisations’ (2006–07) 23 Emory Bankruptcy 
Developments Journal 13; Peter Meltzer, ‘Getting Out of Jail Free: Can the Bankruptcy Plan Process be Used 
to Release Nondebtor Parties?’ (1997) 71 American Bankruptcy Developments Law Journal 1.  
69  In re Zale Corp, 62 F3d 746 (5th Cir 1995); In re Lowenschuss, 67 F3d 1394 (9th Cir 1995); Abel v West, 932 
F2d 898 (10th Cir 1991). 
70  See further Michael Legg, ‘Shareholder Class Actions in Australia — The Perfect Storm?’ (2009) 31 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 669. 
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Lehman entities offshore. The High Court has previously held that the goal of an efficient 
insolvency regime should not be used to limit the scope of investor protection and 
compensation laws.71 
The Lehman litigation highlights a tension that is steadily building in Australian law 
between providing investors with compensation for defective corporate disclosure and 
promoting an efficient, and effective, set of corporate rescue laws that facilitate the 
restructuring of viable companies in financial distress. Each of these policy goals are equally 
valuable and form important functions in making Australian capital markets attractive to 
local and overseas investors. The courts should not be left alone in considering these 
tensions, a more comprehensive review of policy in this area is warranted. 
On its face, it is possible to see the Lehman case as purely one of statutory 
interpretation, one of a growing number of cases slowly teasing out the scope and meaning 
of the provisions regulating deeds of company arrangement. Of course, much will depend 
upon how the High Court’s reasons address the issues under consideration in the appeal. On 
the other hand, as the above discussion demonstrates, the decision is an important 
development for the broader issue of how far Australian corporate insolvency law should go 
in facilitating corporate restructuring. In short, the decision raises an important policy 
question regarding how flexible should our corporate insolvency laws be? The above 
discussion has shown that different jurisdictions take different approaches to the question of 
whether third party releases should be included, with both Canada and England adopting a 
nexus test for allowing reorganisation plans to include third party releases, but the United 
States taking (perhaps unusually in the area of debt restructuring) a more conservative 
approach in refusing to allow third party releases as a matter of course, although as always 
with US law there are conflicting authorities. It is an open question as to whether the 
Lehman releases would satisfy a nexus test if imposed on the deeds in question. However, 
this may be a question that requires a policy driven legislative treatment rather than a case 
by case assessment from the courts.  
 
 
71  Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2007) 231 CLR 160. See further Anil Hargovan and Jason Harris, ‘The 
Shifting Balance of Shareholders’ Interests in Insolvency: Evolution or Revolution?’ (2007) 32 Melbourne 
University Law Review 591.  
